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THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 17 OF THE
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940
TO PORTFOLIO AFFILIATES
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 17 of the Investment Company Act of 1940,1 for many
years a hazard principally to persons planning direct transactions with
investment companies, now stands as an obstacle also to corporations
planning mergers with one another, should an investment company
hold five percent of either's outstanding voting securities. The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission (SEC) not long ago served notice that
it will seize on the circumstance of statutory affiliation of one party
with an investment company to justify scrutiny which otherwise would
clearly lie outside its power. That the SEC reads too broadly the
extent of review called for under the Act, that it misinterprets section
17 in applying it to such transactions at all,2 that the Act's legislative
history evidences no intention on the part of Congress to regulate such
conduct,3 and that the examination of corporate activity on so for-
tuitous a basis is without support in policy,4 may all be justifiable
observations but provide little comfort to the practitioner who seeks
the consummation of a deal with a minimum of delay occasioned by
legal proceedings. The policymaker's problem here lies in protecting
investment company shareholders without at the same time providing
undue interference with mergers and like transactions.
The root of these problems is that in some respects the SEC's
interpretation of section 17 and in some respects the very language
of section 17 are much broader than the purpose of the legislation as
evidenced by the congressional committee hearings on the proposed
Act. Briefly stated, that purpose was the prohibition of self-dealing,
whether direct or indirect, on the part of investment companies' in-
siders, and the protection of investment company shareholders from
any loss in the value of their shares that might be caused by such
dealing.'
However, section 17(a) has been construed to have substantially
wider implications. This section provides:
It shall be unlawful for any affiliated person or promoter
of or principal underwriter for a registered investment com-
pany (other than a company of the character described in
section 80a-12(d) (3) (A) and (B) of this title [involving
1 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
2 See notes 112-13 infra & accompanying text.
3 See notes 96-102 infra & accompanying text.
4 See text accompanying note 133 infra.
5 See notes 96-102 infra & accompanying text.
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underwriters owned entirely by investment companies-an
exception not relevant for our purposes]), or any affiliated
person of such a person, promoter, or principal underwriter,
acting as principal-
(1) knowingly to sell any security or other property
to such registered company or to any company controlled
by such registered company, unless such sale involves
solely (A) securities of which the buyer is the issuer,
(B) securities of which the seller is the issuer and which
are part of a general offering to the holders of a class of
its securities, or (C) securities deposited with the trustee
of a unit investment trust or periodic payment plan by
the depositor thereof;
(2) knowingly to purchase from such registered
company, or from any company controlled by such reg-
istered company, any security or other property (except
securities of which the seller is the issuer) ; or
(3) to borrow money or other property from such
registered company or from any company controlled by
such registered company (unless the borrower is con-
trolled by the lender) except as permitted in section
80a-21 (b) of this title.6
The impact of this section is mitigated somewhat by the avail-
ability of administrative exemption under section 17(b) .7  That miti-
gation, however, is in turn limited by the SEC's interpretation of
section 17(b); the Commission would seek to protect all parties to
proposed section 17(a) transactions, rather than the investment com-
pany alone.8 Additional hazards for those coming into contact with
6 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (1970). The "except" and "unless" provisions of this
subsection suggest misleadingly a substantial degree of leeway in avoiding its appli-
cation; in point of fact, not only are they narrow by their terms, but their effect is
countered by other (frequently more stringent) sections of the Act. See, e.g., id.
§§ 80a-22 to -23, -26 to -27. Note, however, should be made of the "ordinary course
of business" exception made by § 17(c), applying to merchandise sales and purchases
and to lessor-lessee relationships. See id. § 80a-17(c).
7Id. §80a-17(b) (requiring the SEC to issue orders exempting proposed trans-
actions "if evidence establishes that-(1) the terms of the proposed transaction,
including the consideration to be paid or received, are reasonable and fair and do
not involve overreaching on the part of any person concerned; (2) the proposed
transaction is consistent with the policy of each registered investment company con-
cerned, as recited in its registration statement and reports filed under [the Act];
and (3) the proposed transaction is consistent with the general purposes of [the
Act]").
A further exemption route (of particular desirability, possibly, where antecedent
application for exemption under § 17(b) was overlooked, cf. notes 144-45 infra &
accompanying text) may be afforded by § 6(c) of the Act, which grants the SEC
farreaching discretionary powers. 15 U.S.C. §80a-6(c) (1970). However, the
applicant under § 17(b) may be able to assert a stronger claim to exemption.
8 The statutory language does not specify the intended beneficiary of the SEC's
scrutiny. Where the SEC would read the prohibition to bar "overreaching [of
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investment companies, even though nothing cognizable as a "sale" or
"purchase" under section 17(a) is involved, may be found in section
17(d) and rule 17d-1 promulgated thereunder,9 which operate to im-
pose a similar regulatory scheme in a much wider variety of situations.
The breadth of these sections resides in their use of the term
"affiliated person," which is defined in section 2(a) (3) of the Act
as follows:
"Affiliated person" of another person means (A) any
person directly or indirectly owning, controlling, or holding
with power to vote, 5 per centum or more of the outstanding
voting securities of such other person; (B) any person 5 per
centum or more of whose outstanding voting securities are
directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power
to vote, by such other person; (C) any person directly or
indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control
with, such other person; (D) any officer, director, partner,
copartner, or employee of such other person; (E) if such
other person is an investment company, any investment
adviser thereof or any member of an advisory board thereof;
anyone] on the part of anyone concerned," others would read it as limited to "over-
reaching [of the investment company] on the part of anyone concerned." See notes
9, 46, 133-35 infra & accompanying text.
9 15 U.S.C. §80a-17(d) (1970); 17 C.F.R. §270.17d-1 (1972). Subsection 17(d)
makes unlawful the effecting of "any transaction" involving joint participation with
affiliated investment companies or companies controlled by them "in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe for the purpose of
limiting or preventing participation by such registered or controlled company on a
basis different from or less advantageous than that of such other participant." The
SEC's rule, which establishes an antecedent-exemption procedure, quite arguably goes
beyond the statute to a siguificant degree, in making it unlawful for persons standing
in the affected relationship to each other to "participate in, or effect any transaction
in connection with, any joint enterprise or other joint arrangement or profit-sharing
plan," 17 C.F.R. §270.17d-l(a) (1972), and in defining the latter to embrace
any written or oral plan, contract, authorization or arrangement, or any
practice or understanding concerning an enterprise or undertaking whereby
[persons standing in the affected relationship] have a joint or a joint
and several participation, or share in the profits of such enterprise or
undertaking ....
Id. § 270.17d-l(c). The SEC has thus far escaped or survived challenge, however,
on the validity of its rule. See notes 13-14 27-33 75-78 infra & accompanying text.
The SEC, in interpreting the standard for exemption under rule 17d-1, unlike
under § 17(b), has tended to restrict scrutiny to the impact of the proposed arrange-
ment upon the investment company alone. Compare American Hawaiian S.S. Co.,
SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5675 (May 13, 1969) (exemption granted
under rule 17d-1; impact upon other parties ignored), with Gould v. American
Hawaiian S.S. Co., 331 F. Supp. 981 (D. Del. 1971) (proxy rules held violated;
arguable unfairness to other parties brought out in this action based on same facts).
It can be argued from § 17(d)'s concern simply that the investment company not
participate "on a basis different from or less advantageous than" others, that a
similarly-restricted concern for the investment company alone should be inferred in
§ 17(b). That different language is used need not be taken to imply different con-
cerns: the simplest explanation for the apparent discrepancy would appear to be
that the Act's draftsmen recognized that to speak of a party's basis of participation
in a purchase or sale transaction, or to speak of the fairness of the consideration,
etc., in a joint participation, would be to achieve facial congruity at the expense of
verbal integrity.
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and (F) if such other person is an unincorporated investment
company not having a board of directors, the depositor
thereof.'0
Clause (B) should not always be applied to section 17(a); it is hard to
imagine how a company affiliated with an investment company in this
way (hereinafter referred to as a "portfolio affiliate") could be sup-
posed to be in a position to deal with the investment company to the
latter's detriment." Thus, it would seem that the mere fact of such
an affiliation provides scant justification for presuming the likelihood
of any form of unfair influence such as would require SEC scrutiny.
An argument might therefore be made that so far as section 17(a) is
concerned, clause (B) can be read out of the definition of "affiliated
person" on the ground that it only applies "unless the context otherwise
requires" '2-not in the case of portfolio affiliates.
This Comment will, in its next three parts, examine the SEC's
interpretation of section 17. The Commission's approach will first
be laid out objectively and in greater detail, with a discussion of some
practical problems created by this approach, in part II. In part III,
the validity of that approach will be judged in light of the background
of section 17. And in part IV, the desirability of that approach
10 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (3).
L"But cf. SEC v. Talley Indus., Inc., 399 F.2d 396, 403 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969) ("[Clongress could have thought that downstream
affiliation also involved some danger that the investment company's stockholders
might be put upon for the benefit of other stockholders of the affiliate.").
There is, however, a far more plausible explanation for the inclusion of clause
(B), if one considers the second-level affiliations embraced by § 17's proscriptions of
certain acts whether performed by "any affiliated person . . . or any affiliated person
of such a person." If the first-level affiliation with the investment company is
"downstream," that is, if the affiliate is controlled by, or owned in excess of 5% by,
the investment company, the statement made in the text with respect to the portfolio
affiliate's inability to harm the investment company is likely to remain accurate,
whether or not further affiliations (downstream or otherwise) with the portfolio
affiliate enter the picture. But if the first-level affiliation with the investment com-
pany is "upstream" in nature, that is, if the affiliate is a director or 5% owner of,
or otherwise in a position to influence, the investment company, then it is apparent
that-in the absence of clause (B) or of the application of §17 to second-level
affiliates-the first-level affiliate could escape the prohibition against self-dealing
simply by consummating such transactions through a company which, by virtue of
his 5%-or-greater ownership, he influences. It is only the clause (B) company in
the latter position-the downstream affiliate of a first-level upstream affiliate of an
investment company-that appears to have been intended as an object of regulation
by the Act's draftsmen, cf. notes 108-11 infra & accompanying text, and it is similarly
the position of this Comment that the downstream-of-upstream affiliate's-but not
the portfolio affiliate's-regulation can be supported on policy grounds. See generally
notes 134-37 infra & accompanying text.
12 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (1970). Given the remedial nature of the Act, however,
such an interpretation is unlikely to succeed. The "unless the context otherwise
requires" phrase, although its dimensions are not clear, may most likely have been
meant as a means for aiding the SEC in reaching abuses that are arguably outside
the literal definitions of § 2(a). Although the same phrase appears in the definitional
sections of the Securities Act of 1933 (§2, 15 U.S.C. §77b (1970)) [hereinafter
referred to as the 1933 Act] and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (§3(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1970)) [hereinafter referred to as the 1934 Act], neither the legis-
lative history, nor the cases under these two acts (nor under the 1940 Act) illuminate
the reach of the phrase.
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compared to other possible approaches will be weighed on policy
grounds; proposals will be suggested to make section 17 regulation
more consistent with those policies. Finally, because legislative and
administrative solutions may not respond quickly enough to resolve
tomorrow's case, the fifth part of this Comment will offer some sug-
gestions on structuring transactions in ways that will entail minimal
contact with section 17.
II. THE SEC's APPLICATION OF SECTION 17
The case law for the most part accords a wide reach to section 17.
Rightly or not, well-advisedly or not, it poses a formidable handicap
to any who would challenge it. Most of the cases, however, are SEC
opinions of unpersuasive authority: memorandum decisions supporting
grants of exemptions under section 17(b), rule 17d-1, and, occasion-
ally, section 6(c), which gives the SEC a substantial amount of dis-
cretion to grant exemptions from the Act. These opinions are char-
acterized, especially in more recent years, by dry recitations of the facts
presented in the applications for exemption, followed by psittacistic
findings of compliance with the applicable standards for exemption.
The applications are very often unopposed, and in the occasional cases
where a jurisdictional challenge might be appropriate (on the grounds,
for example, that section 17 did not apply to the transaction proposed,
or that statutory affiliation was not present) it is very often disregarded
altogether by the applicant or raised only lukewarmly. Following a
practical or expedient approach, it may be the case that "[a]pplicants
do not concede that Section 17(d) of the Act and Rule 17d-1 there-
under are applicable to the proposed transactions, but seek relief there-
under in order to eliminate any question as to full compliance with
Section 17(d) of the Act." 13 Resort to the courts is infrequent,
most likely because of time pressures and because of the SEC's decision
to grant an exemption and thus render the jurisdictional ambiguities
matters of much less moment.14 The effect of all this is to give the
would-be challenger of the SEC's interpretation rather little encourage-
ment. (It is unknown, of course, how many section 17 violations in
the past may have escaped the scrutiny of the SEC in the absence of
any applications for exemption. Although it may be unlikely, there-
fore, that the SEC would initiate litigation, still if its interpretations
of section 17 were to be applied in any court action by a strike-suitor,
the portfolio affiliate who disputes the SEC's reading will have a
difficult position to maintain.)
13 Axe-Houghton Stock Fund, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No.
5098, at 4 (Sept. 21, 1967).
14 In E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 34 S.E.C. 531 (1953), the SEC announced
its claim to a wider jurisdiction under § 17 only after its finding that an exemption
would be granted in that case. For a description of the SEC's narrower jurisdiction
prior to this decision, see note 113 infra & accompanying text.
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A. Section 17 in Focus: The Talley Litigation
The recent merger of Talley Industries and General Time Cor-
poration (GTC) attracted the attention of many commentators, as it
dramatized the potential for interference inherent within section 17.15
Talley embarked upon its acquisition plan in the last days of 1967,
and indicated its intentions to American Investors Fund, Inc. (the
Fund), a mutual fund which, by virtue of its holding nine percent
of Talley's voting shares, was a statutory affiliate of Talley."8 The
Fund, after reviewing its data on GTC, acquired a substantial number
of GTC shares through Talley's broker. This transaction was con-
summated without any collateral agreement between the Fund and
Talley as to the voting of the shares at the forthcoming annual stock-
holders meeting of GTC. Indeed, the Fund made the purchase of
shares because, in its evaluation, the potential success of the merger
made such an investment attractive. Above all, it is apparent that
the Fund's own self-interest dictated it buy the shares and vote them
as it did.
GTC rejected Talley's proposal of a friendly merger, and brought
an action 17 against Talley and the Fund alleging violation of section
17(d) of the Act' s and rule 17d-1 19 thereunder, which bar affiliates
from engaging in transactions as joint participants with an investment
company without prior SEC approval. This suit was ultimately dis-
missed for lack of standing.2" In the meantime, Talley, without any
assistance or participation from the Fund, embarked on a proxy cam-
paign in order to gain control of GTC's board of directors. In con-
junction with this, and pursuant to rule 17d-1, Talley was required
to apply for SEC approval of its concurrent acquisition of GTC stock
by itself and the Fund.21 The Commission rebuffed Talley's assertion
15 Analysis, Securities Transactions by Investment Company Affiliates, BNA
Sa~c. REG. & L. REP., Apr. 1, 1970, at B-1 [hereinafter cited as BNA Analysis];
Dudley, Transactions With Affiliates, in PLI MUTUAL FUNDS 357 (1970); Routier,
Affiliated Person and Section 17, in PLI MUTuAL FuNDs 369 (1970); Kroll, The
"Portfolio Affiliate" Problem, PLI 3D INST. ON SEc. REG. 261 (1972).
16 See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2(a) (3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (3)
(1970).
17 General Time Corp. v. American Investors Fund, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 400
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nom. General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
IS 15 U.S.C. §80a-17(d) (1970).
19 17 C.F.R. §270.17d-1 (1971).
20 283 F. Supp. at 402-03.
Cf. Bangor Punta Corp. v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1147, 1154
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (counterclaim brought by successful contender in take-over contest,
for increased acquisition costs allegedly incurred as a result of loser's violations of
§ 17(a), dismissed; counterclaimant held "well beyond the pale of protection fairly
intended by [§ 17(a) ]").
A second GTC suit, seeking injunctive relief for alleged violations of the SEC's
proxy rules, was dismissed on the merits. General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus.,
Inc., 283 F. Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
21 See SEC v. Talley Indus., Inc., 399 F.2d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1015 (1969).
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that section 17(d) did not apply, and denied Talley's application for
exemption as well, finding a prohibited joint arrangement and "no
warrant for granting retroactive approval of the transactions effected
in such violation." 22 On the basis of this determination, made April
19, 1968, GTC made a further request to Judge Tyler to enjoin Talley
from voting its shares at the upcoming GTC shareholders' meeting,
but once again was unsuccessful.2" The election was held as scheduled,
with preliminary reports indicating Talley's nominees had won
control.24
On May 1, 1968, the SEC brought an action under section 17(d)
to require the withdrawal of Talley's votes cast at the meeting.25
Talley won a clear victory in the district court, where Judge Wyatt
chided:
The SEC allowed itself to be persuaded, unwisely as it
seems to me, to throw its weight on the side of one of two
contending factions in a situation where the stockholders of
Time [GTC]-the real parties in interest-were being given
an opportunity, as Judge Tyler found, in the exercise of
corporate democracy to make an "informed choice".2"
Judge Wyatt viewed the SEC's independent civil action as not bound
by the Commission's findings, and went on to find that Talley had
effected no "transaction" in which the fund was a "joint or joint and
several participant." 27 He wrote:
Fund has no financial interest of any sort in the shares of
Time bought by Talley nor any agreement, understanding or
commitment of any sort ever to have any such interest.
There is no conceivable way by which Fund can be in any
way affected financially by the purchase by Talley of the
shares.28
He went on to satisfy himself not only that the language of section
17(d) did not apply to the concurrent stock purchases by the Fund
and Talley but that the legislative history clearly indicated the section
was aimed at very different situations.29
2 2 See id. at 401.
23 See id.
241d.
25 SEC v. Talley Indus., Inc., 286 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 399 F.2d 396
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969), decree on remand aff'd, 407 F.2d
65 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
26 Id. at 57-58.
27 Id. at 58-59.
28 Id. at 58.
29Id. at 59-60.
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On appeal, the moral victory was the SEC's, although Talley
retained its practical success." Judge Friendly, unlike Judge Wyatt,
was deferential to the SEC's determination and refused to cast the
agency in the same role as a private litigant. He ruled that the con-
gressional policy behind section 43 (a) of the Act, making the Com-
mission's determination of factual questions conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence, applied to the case, although this section (relating
to direct review of SEC orders) was not expressly applicable by its
terms. 1 Judge Friendly went on to find there was substantial evidence,
buttressed by the SEC's "knowledge of the unspoken customs of the
business world," that:
[D]evelopments may well have brought Industries and Fund
into a "combination" not clearly envisioned by either at the
outset . . . . [A]fter [Fund president George] Chestnutt
had seen Industries spend over $8,300,000 in acquiring the
205,837 shares purchased in the special offer and on February
21 and 23, he was no longer a completely free agent as to
the 210,000 shares Fund had purchased, on Talley's recom-
mendation, for about 70% of that price. Experienced busi-
ness men must have known at the outset that such a situation
might arise.3 2
Judge Friendly upheld the validity of rule 17d-l's requiring advance
application for exemption in all cases. He reasoned that the SEC
could well have determined that to specify a narrower set of circum-
stances in which advance application must be made, might fail to
accomplish the purpose of section 17(d), given the infinite varieties
in which an investment company's participation in a joint undertaking
could be different from that of an affiliate. 3  Friendly balked, however,
at endorsing the relief asked for by the SEC. He left it to the district
court to formulate an injunction consistent with the Second Circuit's
admitted failure
to perceive how the interest of Fund's stockholders would be
advanced by such provisions as requiring Industries and
Fund to withdraw votes cast at the April 22 stockholders'
meeting of General Time and enjoining further voting by
them. . . . Whether or not General Time had sufficient
standing to direct judicial attention to the violation of
§ 17(d), an issue on which we have no occasion to pass,
30 SEC v. Talley Indus., Inc., 399 F2d 396 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1015 (1969).
31 Id. at 403. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-42 (1970).
32 399 F.2d at 404.
3 Id. at 404-05.
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protection of the interests of its management in retention in
office is not an objective of that section.3
Since, given the novelty of the application of section 17(d) to the
fact situation, Talley and the Fund could not be regarded as having
deliberately flouted the statute, there was no reason, Judge Friendly
held, to frame an injunction going beyond what was necessary to
protect the Fund's shareholders.3 5 Such a minimal order was handed
down by Judge Wyatt on remand; " he enjoined Talley and the Fund
from future transactions violative of section 17(d), but provided that
certain acts, among them the voting by each of its GTC shares, would
not be deemed violative of section 17(d) provided there was no con-
sultation between Talley and the Fund concerning those acts. Wyatt's
order also included "elaborate provisions designed to insure Fund equal
or preferential treatment with respect to any sale of the GTC shares." "
GTC appealed, asking that the votes cast by the Fund and Talley
be ordered withdrawn. The Second Circuit refused to discuss the
merits of GTC's request, holding that it had no standing to appeal
the order. 8 It noted, however, that its endorsement of the limited
relief was "limited to the special circumstances of this case-an excus-
able violation of § 17(d) based on what we considered to be an overly
literal although not unnatural reading of its words." " The result,
then, is that even though Talley and the Fund weathered the litigation
well enough for their practical purposes, it remains unclear how great
a reach will be accorded section 17(d) in the future, and whether
future violations will be as innocent or excusable in the view of the
courts.
With the Supreme Court's denials of certiorari in the various
actions under section 17(d) ,40 the seating of GTC's new directors
took place on January 13, 1969, and the expected merger arrangements
were announced shortly thereafter. But the merger could not be
completed for more than a year. It was now clear, of course, that
the SEC would have to be reckoned with, and the merger agreement
was conditioned on the obtaining of an exemption under section 17(b)
for the exchange, pursuant to the merger, of the Fund's GTC shares
for shares of Talley. An application accordingly was filed. Talley's
34 d. at 405.
3 5 1d. at 405-06.
3a Judge Wyatt's decree is unreported, but is described in the Second Circuit's
opinion in the appeal from his decree. See SEC v. General Time Corp., 407 F.2d
65, 68 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
371d.
381d. at 70-72.
3Dld. at 70 n.6.
40 General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 393 U.S. 1026 (1969), denying
cert. to 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968); General Time Corp. v. SEC, 393 U.S. 1026
(1969), denying cert. to 407 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1968); General Time Corp. v. SEC,
393 U.S. 1015 (1969), denying cert. to 399 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1968).
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argument (raised only tangentially in its brief,41 which perhaps reflected
a realistic appraisal of the point's likelihood of success) that the
exchange did not constitute a transaction subject to section 17(a),
was quickly rebuffed by the SEC.42 The Commission cited, in support
of its position, a line of its decisions-all involving mergers arranged
by the investment companies involved or by companies controlled by
those companies-holding mergers subject to section 17.43  In only
one earlier reported decision had the SEC applied section 17 to a
merger where the investment company was not in a position of control
and did not participate in the merger negotiations; that case, Aetna
Life Insurance Co., 44 was not cited by the SEC in Talley, and could
provide little authority, because jurisdiction was conceded by the appli-
cant there with the goal of obtaining an exemption as expeditiously as
possible.4"
The SEC went on to apply its interpretation of the standards of
section 17(b) to the Talley proposal, and found the merger terms
unfair to GTC shareholders. Talley increased, as the SEC demanded,
the conversion ratio for the Talley Series B convertible preferred stock
to be offered the GTC shareholders, and the SEC's approval was
finally obtained on February 10, 1970.
Although the rationale for the proceeding, as for the Investment
Company Act itself, was to protect the investment company's share-
holders, the SEC's opinion has relatively little to say about the Fund's
participation in the proceeding. Even granting that the Fund's par-
ticipation in the acquisition of GTC shares may have been prompted
in consultation with Talley, it was clear that the Fund had not nego-
tiated with Talley or with GTC on the exchange ratio, and was
certainly not being overreached by an insider in a position to influence
the Fund. Indeed, if the Fund's votes would be essential to approval
of the merger, as they were to the election of the new directors, the
relationship was precisely to the contrary. The SEC might well have
based its decision upon its view that the Fund's holding of nine percent
of GTC's shares, and just six percent of Talley's, would cause the
Fund to be a net beneficiary of any exchange ratio more favorable
to the GTC shareholders. The opinion leaves the impression, however,
that the SEC was operating with an intention to decree an absolutely
fair price, and not necessarily to forward the investment company's
interest. Indeed, other decisions have produced results disadvantageous
41 Applicant's Post-Hearing Memorandum at 57-60, Talley Indus., Inc., SEC
Investment Company Act Release Nos. 5953 (Jan. 9, 1970), 5977 (Feb. 10, 1970),
in [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FFa. SEc. L. RIs. 11 77,774, 77,783.
42 Talley Indus., Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5953 (Jan. 9,
1970), in [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FaD. SEC. L. REP. 77,774, at 83,785.
43 1d. at 83,785 n.5.
44 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4082 (Nov. 19, 1964), in [1964-
1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,159.
45 See BNA Analysis, supra note 15, at B-7.
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to the investment companies involved. 6
The effect, then, of a statute the purpose of which was the pro-
tection of investment company shareholders from loss through insider
self-dealing,4" was to delay for two years a transaction in which there
was no palpable wrongdoing of any sort. Although aware of Talley's
intention to acquire GTC by merger, the Fund engaged in no negotia-
tions with Talley and, aside from voting its GTC shares, took no part
in Talley's proxy contest to place its candidates on GTC's board. The
Fund was treated no differently from other GTC (or Talley) share-
holders and indeed, the only connection the Fund had with Talley
was its ownership of more than five percent of Talley's outstanding
voting shares.
Talley is certainly the most dramatic case of this expanded appli-
cation of section 17 of the Act, but it is by no means the only situation
which might bring such a result. A similar result might well obtain
wherever section 17(a) is brought into play by the fact that a corpora-
tion statutorily affiliated with an investment company undertakes to
merge, through an exchange of shares (or, quite possibly, as will be
treated briefly in the final section of this Comment, through other
means),4 with another corporation even a single share of whose stock
is held by the same investment company.49 In 1958, there were more
than 150 investment company portfolio holdings of the requisite size; 5o
in 1969, more than 350; " and for the first financial quarter of 1972,
it seems the pattern prevails.52 Even if SEC action appears unlikely
in the many mergers that these companies might engage in, the specter
of private suits can not be dismissed so readily.
4 6 See, e.g., Bowser, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4842
(Feb. 8, 1967), in [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1177,435.
47 See notes 96-102 infra & accompanying text.
48 See text accompanying notes 148-53 infra.
49 If the investment company owns any stock in the company with which an
affiliate merges by means of an exchange of stock, the affiliate, in the SEC's view,
sells to the investment company by giving shares of its stock to the investment
company in exchange for those shares of the target company the investment company
owns. The shares received by the affiliate from the investment company constitute
a purchase by the affiliate under this interpretation. Under § 17(a), both sales of
stock to, and purchases of stock from, an investment company by one of its affiliates
are prohibited.
5 0
W irARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE & COMMERCE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS,
H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1962) [hereinafter cited as WHARTON
REPORT].
51 BNA Analysis, supra note 15, at B-2.
52 Statistics on portfolio holdings of the 286 investment companies with $25
million or more in assets indicate 283 instances of portfolio affiliation. See ARTHUR
LIPPER CORP., INSIGHT: Booic TWo-PORTFOLIO HOLDINGS . . . OF FUNDS vii, xiii,
1-163 (1st quarter 1972). Such statistics are not readily available for the 126
investment companies with between $10 and $25 million in assets, see id. BooK ONE-
HOLDINGS AND TRANSACTIONS xiii, or for smaller companies. Five-percent-or-greater
holdings in portfolio companies are related more to an investment company's goals
and policies than to its size. See id. BooK FOUR-PoRTFOLIO PERSPECTrVE 373-79.
Additionally, the dimensions of the problem may be aggravated, if a fund complex's
holdings must be aggregated, see note 58 infra.
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B. The Problem of Portfolio Affiliation
The threshold problem in this area is the identification of instances
of portfolio affiliation. Determining what falls within the definition is
not so difficult under section 2(a) (3) of the 1940 Act as is, for exam-
ple, determining ownership of certain percentages of equity securities
for purposes of sections 13(d) or 16(a) of the 1934 Act.53 While
questions may arise under the 1934 Act with respect to whether con-
vertible securities, 4 contracts to purchase securities at some future
time,5 5 or puts and calls 56 are included within the definition of "equity
securities" under various reporting requirements, the Investment Com-
pany Act's definition of "affiliated person" in clause (A) and in clause
(B) of section 2(a) (3)-the focus of concern in portfolio affiliation
problems-turns on the notion of a "voting security." " The latter
term is given an unambiguous operational definition in section 2(a)
(42) as being "any security presently entitling the owner or holder
thereof to vote for the election of directors of a company." 18
The more difficult problem is a practical, not a legal, one: dis-
covering that an affiliation exists. Since the SEC receives from regis-
tered investment companies each year a total of several thousand
required filings, it seems unreasonable to require operating companies
to inspect all of them to determine when an affiliate relationship exists.59
While the 1934 Act's section 13(d) 60 in its recently-amended form,
requires stockholdings of more than five percent to be reported to the
company concerned, as well as to the SEC, this is not a completely
adequate answer either. It is unclear, for one thing, whether section
13(d) filings would be required of a fund-holding complex or of a
group of investment companies under single advisership. Bath Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Blot 61 suggests that such filings would be required,
53 15 U.S.C. §§78m(d), 78p(a) (1970).
54 See Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967) (over
10% of convertible debentures held not the equivalent of 10% of "any class of equity
security" where conversion would yield less than 3% common stock).
55 Cf. Booth v. Varian Associates, 334 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 961 (1965) (future contract to purchase securities held to be an "equity
security").
56 See Silverman v. Landa, 306 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1962) (call options held not
to be the equivalent of "equity securities").
57 15 U.S.C. §§80a-2(a) (3) (A), (B) (1970).
58 15 U.S.C. §80a-2(a) (42) (1970).
Whether shares held by two investment companies under a single adviser would
be added together for purposes of determining affiliation is less clear, but, since the
Act's concern with affiliation is grounded in patterns of influence and control (see
notes 84-89 infra & accompanying text), the answer most in accord with the Act's
purposes is that they should. While this question has not been ruled on definitively,
many of those who are active in the area assume this would be the result. Kroll,
supra note 15, at 267-69.
59 See 36 SEC ANN. REP. 136 (1970).
6015 U.S.C. §78m(d) (1970).
61427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'g 305 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Wis. 1969). See
generally Comment, Section 13(d) and Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership,
119 U. PA. L. REv. 853 (1971).
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however, and certainly the SEC could exert its rulemaking authority
to bring about a closer interface between the duties placed on stock-
holders by the 1934 Act's section 13(d) and the needs of portfolio
companies under the 1940 Act's sections 2(a) (3) and 17. Further,
a failure to make an accurate filing under section 13(d) would not
harm the investment company under section 17 (which prohibits the
affiliate from doing certain things) but could have seriously harmful
consequences for the affiliate; this, perhaps, might likewise be remedied
by an SEC rule, here excusing violations by the portfolio affiliate and
imposing personal liability upon the fund's management, where proper
filing has not been made. The most significant drawback to reliance
on section 13(d) is that not all companies are subject to the 1934
Act's filing requirements."2 Indeed, it is in the case of smaller, non-
reporting companies that many of the substantial holdings that give
rise to portfolio affiliation may be expected, because it is possible to
hold a greater percentage of their stock with a small investment. In
the absence of SEC action requiring reporting by investment companies
to all statutory affiliates, 3 perhaps the most feasible solution for many
portfolio companies would be to subscribe to a service that reports the
holdings of investment companies on a periodic basis.
Some companies may well prefer not to be portfolio affiliates,
given the obstacles this could pose to one's financial activities. It
seems most unlikely that one could ban outright the acquisition of
one's securities by investment companies without incurring de-listing
by the exchanges. But it may be possible to secure the cooperation
of the investment company in a sale to the portfolio affiliate, at the
then-prevailing market price, of all securities in excess of what would,
after the purchase, be five percent of the affiliate's outstanding voting
securities. An exemption under section 17(b) would have to be
obtained, of course, but this seems unlikely to pose a problem. Cer-
tainly, a sale of securities at the current market price would be likely
to meet the "reasonable and fair" standard which is required by that
section for an exemption. In the event the investment company is
uncooperative, little could readily be done to end the affiliation, it seems,
and in any event nothing could be done to prevent its recurrence.
One technique which may be resorted to by the unwilling portfolio
affiliate in extremis would entail the following steps (and, it should
be clear, substantial costs) : first, the purchase of more than three per-
cent of the investment company's outstanding voting securities (taking
into account the fact that in the case of an open-end company, this
figure is subject to constant increase); and then, the issuance and
6 Under the 1934 Act, many smaller companies are not subject to registration
unless they are listed on an exchange. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(a), (g) (1970).
63 A system that identifies statutory affiliates, however, still leaves an element
of uncertainty about merger activities between an affiliate and a nonaffiliate company.
The affiliate does not know if the same fund that owns 5% or more of its shares
also owns any shares of the nonaffiliate; ownership of even a few such shares could
trigger § 17 scrutiny.
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sale of additional securities of the portfolio company in sufficient num-
ber to reduce the investment company's present holdings below what
will be the five percent mark. Because of the "cross-ownership"
(defined in section 20(c), as two companies each owning three percent
or more of the other's stock) created in the first step, the investment
company-when placed on notice of the cross-ownership--will be
barred under the Act from making any further purchases of the port-
folio company's shares. 4 It may be feasible to finance the purchase
of the investment company's shares with the proceeds of the sale of
the affiliate's shares. Once again, however, it should be noted that
techniques such as that suggested can only serve to eliminate instances
of affiliation, not to prevent their recurrence.
Affiliation once established, the range of transactions proscribed by
section 17 is substantial. Section 17(a) (1), proscribing sales directly
to the investment company or companies controlled by it, is not often
individually a problem-most likely because the investment company
can usually purchase what it desires on the market with little difficulty. 5
Section 17(a) (2) has been applied to the purchase of the portfolio
affiliate's own securities, both pursuant to a tender offer 66 and other-
wise,6" and to the purchase of third companies' securities 6s of of patents
and licenses 69 as well, but the SEC met with defeat in attempting to
apply it to the redemption of debentures substantially according to terms
set out in the instrument redeemed.7 °
Sections 17(a) (1) and (2), operating in tandem, have been ap-
plied not only to mergers through the exchange of securities, as in the
Talley case, but also to the conversion of preferred stock into common,71
and of bonds into common, 72 to the exchange of new warrants for old,73
6415 U.S.C. §80a-20(c) (1970).
65 One application of this section that might not be obvious, however, is to the
exercise of warrants; see Axe-Houghton Stock Fund, Inc., SEC Investment Company
Act Release No. 5122 (Oct. 5, 1967).
On this, and on the releases cited in notes 66-77 infra, see Kroll, supra note
15, at 273-89.
66 Scripps-Howard Inv. Co., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5175
(Nov. 27, 1967).
67 Chamberlain Mfg. Corp., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6394
(Mar. 22, 1971).
68 Great Am. Ins. Co., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4989 (June
13, 1967).
69 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., SEC Investment Company Act Release No.
6526 (May 17, 1971).
70 SEC v. Sterling Precision Corp., 393 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1968), aff'g 276
F. Supp. 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
7 1 Axe-Houghton Fund A, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No.
5150 (Oct. 30, 1967).
72 Missouri-K.-T.R.R., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5182 (Dec.
4, 1967).
73 Value Line Special Situations Fund, SEC Investment Company Act Release
No. 6621 (July 15, 1971).
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and to the amendment of a loan agreement in effecting the subordina-
tion of certain debentures.74
Section 17(d), particularly as interpreted through the SEC's rule
17d-1 (which, it will be recalled, the Second Circuit has given at least
a qualified endorsement to),' has more flexibility in its application than
any of the others. It has been applied to a registered joint public offer-
ing of the affiliate's securities to be made by both the investment com-
pany and the affiliate.7" Although there is no case presenting the situ-
ation, it might be supposed to apply to the concurrent acceptance of a
tender offer by both investment company and portfolio affiliate. It has
been applied to the mere concurrent holding of securities in a third com-
pany by both investment company and affiliate.77 And, of course, it was
applied in SEC v. Talley Industries, Inc.,78 to the concurrent acquisition
of a third company's securities.
Since most of the above-enumerated transactions, unlike the ex-
change of shares in the Talley case, as a matter of course involve nego-
tiations between the investment company and the affiliate, it seems less
disturbing that the SEC should be permitted to oversee those trans-
actions. Yet the departure from the purpose of protecting the invest-
ment company's shareholders is just as clear-whether there is nego-
tiation or not-whenever it is the investment company that in fact is in
a position to influence the affiliate. Under the state of the current case
law, however, it is not possible to avoid the operation of section 17, on
this reasoning.
III. BACKGROUND FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 17
Both the underlying purposes and the language of section 17 raise
serious questions with respect to the validity of the SEC's current
interpretation. In any event, the changes in the generation since its
passage mandate a reassessment of the SEC's position.
A. The Purposes Underlying Section 17
The purposes of section 17, as understood by both those who passed
the statute as well as those who were first confronted with it, seem to
7 Greater Washington Indus. Invs., Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release
No. 3759 (Aug. 29, 1963).
75SEC v. Talley Indus., Inc., 399 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1015 (1969).
76 First Provident Co., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6400 (Mar.
23, 1971).
7 7 Wisconsin Sec. Co., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5708 (June
12, 1969). A revision of rule 17d-1, considered by the SEC, see 32 Fed. Reg. 14,968-
70 (1967), but never adopted, would, among other changes, have decreed a violation
if either the portfolio affiliate or the investment company held 2% or more of the
securities of a third party any of whose securities were held by the other. It seems
likely that Judge Friendly was influenced by this proposal in SEC v. Talley Industries,
Inc. See 399 F.2d 396, 403 n.7 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969).
The proposed revision was withdrawn, 34 Fed. Reg. 18,954 (1969).
78 399 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969).
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have been the prevention of self-dealing on the part of those managing
and controlling investment companies and the inhibition of pyramiding
through the scrutiny of intercompany transactions in investment com-
pany holding systems. The SEC's broadly-conceived study of invest-
ment trusts 79 discussed at great length the problems of insider self-
dealing to the detriment of investment companies' shareholders: of
loans made to insiders, never repaid, and inadequately secured if at
all; 8 of the use of investment companies as disposal grounds, at in-
flated prices, for securities otherwise unmarketable; s' of the manipula-
tion of investment company portfolios to suit the purpose of the in-
siders.82  "These various transactions," the SEC reported, "were
permeated with conflicting interests, and many were characterized by
the absence of arm's-length dealing and by opportunities for over-
reaching." 8' The drafters of the Investment Trust Study were, of
course, concerned with the potential for abuse in mergers and consoli-
dations, but only where the investment company itself was undergoing
reorganization.8" For the most part, however, even this concern was
based on the finding that shifts in the control of investment companies
often occurred as a result of the desire of the unscrupulous to place
themselves in positions affording opportunities for self-dealing.85 Fur-
thermore, when a portion of the Study transmitted to Congress only
several months after the passage of the Investment Company Act, and
not printed until 1942,86 did at one point concern itself with abuses in
intercompany transactions in securities, it was almost exclusively be-
cause of the role such transactions played in the shifting of control of
investment companies. 7 This may properly be construed as evidence
in support of the position that so far as section 17 is concerned, only
the upstream affiliation under section 2(a) (3) (A), and not the port-
folio affiliation of section 2(a) (3) (B), should be considered. Some
concern was shown at this point for the role which investment com-
panies could play in enabling their sponsors or managers to influence
portfolio company affairs,88 but for the most part, the Study's material
on investment companies' "control and influence over industry" 89 es-
caped inclusion in the "abuses and deficiencies" portion of the Study.
Indeed, the last volume of the Study, in which the material on invest-
79 SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY OF INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COM-
PANIES (1939-1942) [hereinafter cited as INVESTMENT TRUST STUDY].
8o See id. pt. 3, at 22, 2640-720.
81 Id. 22, 2581.
82 Id. 2486-87.
83 Id. 22.
84 See generally id. 1017-561.
85 Id. 1024.
86ld. ch. 7.
87 Id. 2794.
88 Id. 2624.
89 Id. pt. 4.
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ment company influence appears,90 contains little of the disapproving
language so conspicuous in the earlier volumes. The Study pointed
out that according to the nature of the interests which the investment
company seeks to serve, such influence could redound to either the profit
or the detriment of the portfolio company. 1 It thus noted that invest-
ment companies could in some cases occasion the payment of improvi-
dent dividends by their portfolio affiliates in efforts to bolster their own
financial positions, 2 and further related a number of instances in which
investment companies had shown themselves inclined to involve them-
selves in the reorganization of portfolio affiliates. 3 But the Study did
not, on balance, find occasion to score investment companies. It ob-
served that what abuses there had been by virtue of participation by
investment companies in reorganizations and recapitalizations "were
not indigenous to reorganizations controlled by investment companies
but rather were common to most reorganizations . . . ." 4 It then
went on to find a significant value in investment companies' participa-
tion in such affairs:
Investment companies can perform, aside from the function
of furnishing the required additional capital, the vital function
of supplying expert analysis and appraisal of the merits of
the plans of the reorganization particularly with respect to
those situations in which a governmental agency does not
have jurisdiction to pass on or advise with respect to the
fairness of the plan. Thus they can be the articulate effective
protector of the public minority stockholders against unfair-
ness and over-reaching. Experience indicates that they can
occasionally also facilitate reorganizations by accepting less
than their complete legal rights though at the same time mak-
ing a profit, a course extremely difficult for the small individ-
ual investor.9 5
Consistent with the Study's focus of interest, there is no reference to
investment companies' voting as stockholders on proposed mergers or
participating in exchanges of shares in their consummation. In sum-
mary, the SEC's Study that led to the development of investment com-
pany legislation gives no ground for concluding that a transaction such
90 d.
91 Id. 27.
92 Id. 27-28.
93 Id. 29-37, 306-31.
94 Id. 370.
95 Id. 370-71. For a recent case of an investment company's forgoing certain of
its legal rights in order to see a financially-embarrassed portfolio company continue
as a going concern, see Greater Washington Indus. Invs., Inc., SEC Investment
Company Act Release No. 3759 (Aug. 29, 1963). Here the investment company
requested an SEC exemption to allow the subordination of its loan to the portfolio
company.
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as that engaged in by the fund in the Talley case was a matter of serious
concern.
The history of the Act's progress through Congress supports the
same conclusion. Although the industry denounced the bill when intro-
duced as "neither livable nor workable," 96 it endorsed the prohibition
of self-dealing, 97 and that section survived with essentially the same
proscriptions (although with arguable differences in the scheme of
exemptions) 98 into the compromise between the SEC and the industry
that became the Investment Company Act of 1940. David Schenker,
chief counsel for the SEC's study of investment trusts, testified, with
reference apparently to the original bill's section 17:
[T]his bill says that you cannot sit on both sides of the
table when you are dealing with an investment trust. If you
are a director or officer or manager or controlling [note that
Mr. Schenker did not say, "controlled"] person you cannot
sell any property to an investment trust, because you are sit-
ting on one side representing yourself where you have a
pecuniary interest, and you are sitting on the other side repre-
senting the investment trust; and we say that fundamentally
that should not be permitted.9
Mr. Schenker, testifying at a later point in the Senate's hearings, de-
scribed such transactions as "the only thing" proscribed by section 17,
and explained that section as premised on the fiduciary relationship
obtaining between the insider and the investment company -00 -a rela-
tionship quite clearly not obtaining in the case of a portfolio affiliate.
Section 17 seems to have been clearly understood, then, both in the
hearings on the bill '0' and in the committee reports, 10 2 to be simply a
prohibition of conventional self-dealing.
What criticism of investment companies there had been before the
SEC's Study was also focused not on influence over portfolio com-
panies, but rather on self-dealing on the part of insiders. 3 Indeed,
this view was emphasized in reading the Act's section 17, by law review
96 Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking &'
Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., pt. 2, at 345 (1940) (Investment Trusts & Investment
Companies) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
97 E.g., id. 1055-56.
98 Cf. SEC v. Talley Indus., Inc., 399 F.2d 396, 405 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1015 (1969). See also note 33 supra & accompanying text.
99 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, pt. 1, at 130-31.
100 Id. 256.
101 Id. pt. 4, at 1116 (hearings on S. 4108, the compromise bill).
102 SENATE CoMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY AcT OF
1940 & INVESTMENT ADVIsERs ACT OF 1940, S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.
7, 14 (1940); HousE Comm. oN INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, INVESTMENT
COMPANY AcT OF 1940 & INVESTMENT ADVISERS AcT OF 1940, H.R. REP. No. 2639,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 9, 17-18 (1940).
103 For an account of, and excerpts from, prior criticism of the investment
company industry, see INVESTMENT TRUST STUDY, supra note 79, pt. 3, at 39-49.
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commentators of the time 0 and by the SEC itself for many years,10 5
and it is the same interpretation that present-day commentators and
judges most often attach to this section.' Judge McLean, for exam-
ple, wrote in SEC v. Sterling Precision Corp., where he rejected the
Commission's contention that a redemption of securities pursuant to the
terms upon which they were originally issued, could be a "purchase"
subject to section 17(a) (2): "The unsupervised self-dealing which
Congress intended to prevent would seem to be dealing of the sort which
involves negotiations or bargaining between the two companies." lo7
B. The Language of the Act
It is clear by hindsight, however, that the language of section 17
has not been successful in delineating Congress' apparent purpose, and
it is not surprising that this should be the case. Senator Taft at the
1940 Senate hearings confessed some confusion with respect to its
import:
Frankly, it would take all afternoon to study section 17
to find out what it means, before I begin to criticize it. You
define what would be an affiliated person, or any affiliated
person of such a person acting as principal; and then you say
that no affiliated person of an affiliated person of a registered
investment company shall sell any stock to the company. Is
that the English of it? It is certainly pretty hard to under-
stand what this section does prohibit and what it does not.'
The bill's principal draftsman was willing to attempt an explanation.
Mr. Schenker replied to the senator:
What we tried to say-and it is a little complicated-is
that no officer, director, or controlling person, no partner of
his in a firm in which he is a partner, and no company which
104 E.g., Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WAsr. U.L.Q. 303,
317-19, 321 (1941); Thomas, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 9 GEo. WAsH.
L. REV. 918, 937 (1941) ; Comment, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 50 YALE
L.J. 440, 449 (1941) ("[Section 17] is directed at a rather cruder type of peculation
. . .. "); Note, The Investment Company Act of 1940, 41 COLUM. L. REv. 269,
288-89 (1941) ; Federal Legislation, Investment Company Act of 1940, 29 GEo. L.J.
614, 623-24 (1941). Note, Regulation of Investment Companies, 88 U. PA. L. REv.
584, 592, 606 (1940), appeared after publication of the Investment Trust Study, but
before the Senate hearings were held; it called for conventional self-dealing pro-
hibitions.
105 See Hearings on Powers, Duties & Functions of the SEC before a Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,
at 384-85 (1952).
106 E.g., The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAaE LAW.
732, 789, 802 (1969).
107 276 F. Supp. 772, 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
108 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, pt. 1, at 261.
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he controls, shall have the right to sell property to the invest-
ment trust.
The use of the term "affiliated person" is an attempt in a
shorthand way to spell out those situations that I have enu-
merated. Maybe we have not said it, but I think we have.10 9
Today's problem, of course, is that Mr. Schenker's "shorthand" has
been construed to embrace not only the enumerated situations, but also,
via clause (B) of section 2(a) (3), the portfolio affiliate. The lan-
guage, however, is unambiguous and unyielding here, and unless resort
can successfully be had to the "unless-the-context-otherwise-requires"
condition placed on the applicability of section 2 (a)'s definitions,110 the
legislative history therefore may not be used to interpret the statute and
thereby remove the portfolio affiliate from the ambit of section 17.111
The SEC's reading is not so well supported by the Act's language,
when it finds an exchange of securities pursuant to a merger to consti-
tute a "purchase" and a "sale" within the meaning of sections 17 (a) (1)
and (2). The argument seems persuasive that Congress used those
words with full knowledge and approval of the SEC's "no-sale" doc-
trine applied to the issuance of securities in the course of a merger (in
that context, obviating the need to file a registration statement under
the Securities Act of 1933).112 This argument in fact held sway with
the SEC itself until 1953.113
109 Id. Mr. Schenker's reference to companies controlled by investment company
insiders may fairly suggest a concern as well with companies merely influenced by
such insiders. Compare § 2(a) (3) (B) of the Act (influence) with §§2(a) (3) (C),
2(a) (9) (control). See also note 11 supra.
110 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 2a, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2a (1970). See note
12 supra.
1"1 It is a common rule of statutory interpretation that a statute unambiguous
on its face should not be subjected to judicial interpretation. Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1916) ; cf. Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414 (1899).
But cf. Willheim v. Murchison, 342 F.2d 33, 42 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, -.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 840 (1965) : "[A] court should give [the Act] a hospitable reception
but ought not expand its words beyond their natural meaning to bring within its
sweep a transaction . . . which is not the 'mischief and defect' aimed at by the
Act and which it is doubtful that Congress would have wished to include if it had
considered the problem."
11215 U.S.C. §§77a-aa (1970).
113See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 34 S.E.C. 531 (1953), overriding
Phoenix Sec. Corp., 9 S.E.C. 241 (1941).
To apply to Section 17(a) of the Investment Company Act the no-sale
concept . . . would, in effect, make a vote of security holders a substitute
for review under Section 17(b) and would not in our opinion be an inter-
pretation of Section 17(a) consistent with the purposes of the declaration of
policy in Section 1(b) of the Act.
Id. at 534.
Three considerations should enter in determining whether the "no-sale" rule
should extend beyond the 1933 Act to include the 1940 Act. These are: first, the
surface similarity between the provisions of the 1933 and 1940 Acts, that is, the fact
that in both, antecedent filing with the SEC is required before a transaction can be
effected; second, the fact that under the 1933 Act the SEC does not pass upon the
accuracy of the registration statement, while under the 1940 Act the SEC must
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The SEC is on a little better ground in reading section 17(b)'s
language, providing an exemption where there is no overreaching "on
the part of any person concerned," as supportive of its requirement that
there must be fairness in the transaction to parties other than the invest-
ment company. Given the ambiguity of the section, this interpretation
would be most appropriately judged by reference to the legislative
history.
To summarize, then, the SEC's position with respect to both its
jurisdiction under section 17(a) over an exchange of shares pursuant
to a merger, and the statutory standard for exemption under section
17(b), may well have been invalid in the Talley/GTC merger proceed-
ing. On the other hand, the SEC is probably on firmer ground with
respect to its interpretation of section 17(d). As in the case of section
17(a), the downstream affiliate can not escape the section's express
reach on the basis of legislative history because of section 2 (a)'s defini-
tion. Further-except for the most strained applications-the SEC's
position with regard to this provision would probably be upheld, as it
was by Judge Friendly, whenever its reading, even if "overly literal,"
is "not unnatural." 114
C. Interpretation and the Changing Background
Whether the SEC's interpretation of section 17's mandate is valid
or not with respect to the legislative history of the Act, the question can
independently be posed whether that interpretation is desirable or not
in light of developments since the Act's passage. The most striking of
these is the growth of the investment company industry," 5 both in abso-
lute terms and relative to other investors. The SEC's study of invest-
ment trusts all but defined open-end companies (mutual funds) as those
not holding blocks of securities large enough to influence or control
portfolio companies," 0 and found in practice that where such holdings
did exist-usually among closed-end companies-it was very often with
an intent to exercise such influence."' Neither is the general rule today.
Large holdings are no longer uncommon among mutual funds-par-
ticularly not among fund complexes.""' On the other hand, large hold-
ings are probably less often obtained with an aim to control or influence
satisfy itself of the fairness of certain transactions; and third, the fact that the policy
underlying the "no-sale" doctrine (that a "sale" is a voluntary transaction) seems
to obtain under both acts.
"34 SEC v. General Time Corp., 407 F.2d 65, 70 n.6 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1026 (1969).
"3
5 See generally SEC, REPORT ON PUBLIc PoLcy ImpLIcATIONs OF INVESTIMENT
COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter
cited as PUBLIc PoLIcy REPORT].
" 8 See InVESTMENT TRUST STUDY, supra note 79, pt. 1, at 18-28.
117 See id. 26, 76-77.
118ART UR LIPPER CoP., INSIGHT: BOoK TWO-PoRTFOLIO HOLDINGS . . . OF
FUNDs (1st quarter 1972).
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portfolio company management." 9  A further change, although one
more nearly a matter of degree, is the felt need for a healthier system
of "corporate democracy," 12o and the increasing calls for greater insti-
tutional-investor participation. 2' The SEC's currently-proposed rules
for disclosure by investment companies of their policies with respect to
involvement in the affairs of their portfolio affiliates,'22 may prod them
in this direction. Both developments have their impact upon policy
choices for the portfolio affiliate problem, the subject of the next part
of this Comment.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR SELECTING A REGULATORY
APPROACH
A. Evaluating the Basic Approaches
Out of the various policies calling for effectuation in this area,
there have developed three basic regulatory approaches to transactions
between investment companies and their insiders and portfolio affiliates.
The first of these, the approach of the 1940 Act, as its terms may be
best interpreted, is the most stringent. Under this approach, all trans-
actions between "affiliates" and investment companies, with only a few
exceptions, which are dealt with elsewhere in the Act or which involve
no substantial likelihood of preferential treatment, must be presented to
the SEC for advance approval of their fairness to the investment com-
pany's shareholders. 123 A variation on this approach-and, if the legis-
lative history is any guide, the form intended by the drafters of the Act
and by Congress ' 2 4 -would not require agency scrutiny of transactions
with portfolio affiliates.
119 See WHARTON REPORT, supra note 50, at 26; cf. PUnrac POLICy REPORT,
supra note 115, at 308-10.
120 See Blumberg, The Politicalization of the Corporation, 26 Bus. LAw. 1551
(1971); Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARv. L. REV.
1489 (1970) ; Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections
on the Rule of "One Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. Ryv. 1 (1970) ; Schwartz,
The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MicH. L.
REv. 419 (1971).
121 See, e.g., Landau, Do Institutional Investors Have a Social Responsibility?,
4 INsT. INv., July 1970, at 25; cf. Louis, The Mutual Funds Have the Votes, 75
FORTUNE, May 1967, at 150. See also Comment, Mutual Funds, Portfolio Companies
and the Small Investor: The Role of Institutional Influence, 5 COLUm. J.L. & Soc.
PROB. 69 (1969).
122 SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6853 (Dec. 1, 1971), in [1971-
1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f 78,432.
123 The SEC's position has been that the transactions must be fair to everyone
concerned. See Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release
No. 5214 (Dec. 27, 1967), in [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. Smc. L. REP.
1177,522; Bowser, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4842 (Feb. 8,
1967), in [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ff77,435. The precise
legislative scheme is to prohibit the transactions (Investment Company Act of 1940
§ 17, 15 U.S.C. §80a-17(a) (1970)) unless an exemption is granted based on SEC
determination that the transaction is fair and consistent with the purpose of the
investment company and the 1940 Act. See text accompanying notes 5-12 supra.
124 See notes 86-95, 108-09 supra & accompanying text.
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At the other extreme stand the National Association of Securities
Commissioners' 1939 Regulations Governing Investment Trusts,
1 2
'
which were proposed as a form of uniform blue sky law. Apparently,
however, because of the passage of the Investment Company Act one
year later, which substantially reduced the force behind the movement,
these regulations were adopted in only about a dozen states. The ap-
proach employed here is to require the investment company's charter to
include proscriptions of self-dealing by insiders. Thus, the regulations
provide that any "offer or disposal" of investment trust shares is unfair
unless the instruments creating the trust are effective to prevent trust
insiders-the officers, directors, or trustees-from dealing "for or on
behalf of the trust with themselves, as principal or agent or with any
corporation or partnership in which they have a financial interest." 126
These regulations further require that instruments of a trust prohibit
the "purchase" of the shares of a company, for the portfolio of the trust,
where one or more of the fund's officers or directors own beneficially
more than one-half of one percent of the company's shares, and such
directors together own beneficially more than five percent of the com-
pany's shares.'2-  In this respect the regulations seemingly go beyond
the 1940 Act which does not, at least in section 17(a) (1), prohibit in-
vestment companies from purchasing on the open market the shares of
an affiliate of an affiliated person. 2 s
In contrast to the 1940 Act with its exemption procedure, the uni-
form regulations are less concerned with the fairness of particular trans-
actions but rather require per se prohibitions against certain kinds of
transactions or activities of directors. The test appears to be whether
there is a substantial likelihood of conflicting demands on the loyalties
of the trust's directors or officers. Like section 17(a) of the 1940 Act,
the uniform regulations are concerned with "purchases" of shares under
the circumstances set forth, 2' and due to the absence of any exemption
procedure or safety valve to prevent the regulation from going beyond
the point of diminishing returns, a stronger argument may be inade
here that "purchase" should be construed not to include a mere mechani-
cal exchange pursuant to a merger. Such transactions would not come
within any test concerned with the potential effect of divided loyalties
because the discretion left to the directors or officers as managers of
the fund is reduced to a minimum.
125 The uniform regulations, as adopted in New Hampshire, are reprinted in
2 BLUE SKY L. REP. f 32,613, at 28,502-06 (1969).
126 Id. 28,502.
127 Id. 28,502-03.
128 Under the definitions contained in the 1940 Act, a company, 5% of whose
stock is owned by the directors of an investment company, may be referred to as an
affiliate of affiliated persons. While § 17(a) (1) of the 1940 Act may not reach open
market transactions under the circumstances outlined in the text, § 17(d) and rule
17d-1 may be applicable.
1292 BLUE SKY L. REP. 32,613, at 28,502-03 (1969).
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A third regulatory approach, falling somewhere between the two,
might be formulated as a "degree-of-involvement" approach. It would
concern itself, as do both the 1940 Act and the uniform regulations,
with fiduciary self-dealing, and thus would deal with investment com-
pany transactions with upstream affiliates, but only where there was a
substantial degree of involvement on the part of the investment com-
pany in negotiating the terms of the transaction. Such involvement
would not be deemed to include the investment company's voting its
shares on a question presented to all voting stockholders for approval.
Because of the ambiguity necessarily inherent in such a standard, a
statute employing this approach would probably provide for prospective
exemption of transactions, as does the 1940 Act; a similar standard,
geared to protect the shareholders of the investment company, would
be appropriate.
Prior to assessing these approaches with respect to the essential
policies operating in the area, two rationales occasionally put forward
to justify agency scrutiny of transactions with portfolio affiliates may
be laid to rest. Both are discreditable, it is submitted, for the reason
that they are not related to anything in the nature of investment
companies.
It is sometimes suggested that the SEC should prevent investment
companies from taking advantage of others through action on inside
information that they might receive by virtue of their economic in-
fluence with their portfolio affiliates. 3 ° Rule 10b-5,1" however, should
be sufficiently robust to deal with abuses of inside information. How-
ever, to the extent that the contours of that rule and the section under
which it is promulgated are unsettled (in particular, it is unclear
whether it could be applied to the fund in the Talley case) ,132 it should
be noted that if rule 10b-5 does not reach what some would characterize
as inside information abuses, it can be argued that Congress did not
perceive an abuse calling for regulatory action.
A second policy would protect portfolio affiliates from being sub-
jected directly to unfair treatment at the hands of investment companies.
The SEC's zeal to eliminate sharp dealing, wherever possible, and upon
whatever pretext may be available, is understandable. However,
130 See SEC v. Talley Indus., Inc., 399 F.2d 396, 404 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1015 (1969).
13117 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
132 The Talley situation, if it is to be reached under rule lOb-5, must clear the
hurdles of both the Birnbaum rule, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952), not yet without vitality, and the insider
requirement. The former may be the less difficult: the Fund, on the basis of its
knowledge that Talley planned a takeover bid, purchased GTC shares from unknowing
sellers in the market, who could be likely plaintiffs. It is less conceivable, however,
that the Fund could be characterized as an "insider" with respect to GTC or-even
granting that Talley, by the time it told the Fund of its plans, held a substantial
enough block of GTC stock to be labeled an insider-that the information, originating
as it did with Talley, could be tagged as "inside" so far as GTC is concerned.
On the intricacies of rule lOb-5, see generally 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW:
FRAUD, SEC RULE 10b-5 (1971).
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countering this position is the fact that any approach which was not
applied to other institutional investors and large stockholders might well
be construed as unfairly discriminatory. In conjunction with this
factor, there is the further consideration of allocation of resources.
Thus, given the investment companies' demonstrated penchant for not
involving themselves in corporate affairs, 133 to require close scrutiny of
investment company/affiliate relationships would be to commit a great
effort to preventing what is in all likelihood a small chance of abuse.
Two other policy goals are more nearly related to the peculiar
nature and potential abuses of investment company operations. There-
fore, the appropriateness of the three basic regulatory approaches should
be determined by their effectiveness in implementing these legitimate
policies. The first of these policies is the protection of the investment
company's shareholders from losses or unfair treatment at the hands of
upstream affiliates-directors, officers, or companies owning substantial
amounts of the fund shares--dealing with the fund. The need for such
protection was articulated at the hearings on the bill which became the
1940 Act,'3 4 and was ultimately recognized by Congress in the Act
itself.135 One situation clearly within the purview of this policy is that
in which directors arrange for the fund to enter into transactions that
benefit themselves, the directors, rather than the fund. All three
methods of regulation, the 1940 Act, the uniform regulations, and the
proposed "degree-of-involvement" approach would apply to prohibit
such transactions. But suppose the upstream affiliate is a company
rather than a director. In a bargaining situation, where the interests
of those dealing on behalf of the investment company are adverse to the
interests of those dealing on behalf of the other party to a transaction,
the argument that an agency must step in to protect the investment
company's shareholders is less than compelling. However, to the extent
that one may be justified in hesitating to assume an identity of interests
between the investment company's shareholders and its managers ... a
fair argument can be made for independent scrutiny of these trans-
actions. Apparently not applicable where a company rather than a fund
director is the upstream affiliate, the uniform regulations would fail to
achieve such a result. On the other hand, the 1940 Act, and the pro-
posed "degree-of-involvement" approach would be effective to insure
scrutiny for fair dealing.
13 3 See generally D. BAUM & N. STILES, THE SILENT PARTNERS: INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS AND CORPORATE CONTROL (1965).
-34 Senate Hearings, supra note 96, pt. 1, at 204 (remarks of Senator Wagner)
The testimony today, which I wish Senator Taft had listened to, of the
methods used to secure the funds of truckmen, school teachers, domestics,
and these absolutely outrageous misrepresentations made to them, which
induced them to give up and lose their last pennies, has shown us a state
of affairs which we cannot ignore. We have got to devise some means of
protecting the people.
135 See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 1 (b) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (b) (2)
(1970).
136 Cf. INVESTMENT TRUST STUDY, supra note 79, pt. 3, at 1027, 1068, 1084-85.
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Suppose finally, that the fund/upstream-affiliate transaction is only
one of a large number of similar transactions. In other words, consider
the situation in which the affiliate has not arranged any peculiar condi-
tions, but is merely participating on the same terms in a general offer
to purchase or sell. Under these circumstances there is little likeli-
hood that the affiliate is benefiting particularly at the expense of the
fund, and the investor-protection goal will rarely require SEC review
for self-dealing. Under the 1940 Act, however, as distinct from the
"degree-of-involvement" approach, many of these transactions will be
reviewed by the SEC. Indeed, it is not entirely clear whether the uni-
form regulations would accept many of these transactions.
A second policy relative to investment companies is the fostering
of their involvement in portfolio company affairs. The theory here is
that institutional investors with their more significant holdings, possess
superior research resources and expertise which may enable them to
contribute valuably to portfolio company management. By doing so,
they protect their own best interests and, concomitantly, the interests of
smaller, less articulate investors.
1 37
Undeniably, too vigorous pursuit of such a policy might tend to
produce undesirable ramifications: closer identification by fund directors
with the interests of the portfolio company; increased temptation of
fund directors to trade or otherwise take advantage of inside informa-
tion. These problems aside, however, the involvement-fostering policy
argues against SEC scrutiny with its potential for discouragement of
dealings between investment companies and their portfolio affiliates.
This argument is independent of the previous proposition that review is
not necessary in portfolio situations; the threat of review and pos-
sible litigation is likely to have the undesirable effect of discouraging
more active concern with and participation in portfolio company affairs.
Not applicable to investment-company/portfolio-affiliate transactions,
the uniform regulations and the proposed "degree-of-involvement" ap-
proach do not hinder the involvement-fostering policy. The 1940 Act,
on the other hand, at least as administered by the SEC, can present a
significant obstacle. An investment company actively participating in
portfolio company affairs risks litigation under section 17(d) and per-
haps under section 17(a) where a transaction not excepted by that
section is involved.
It appears from the foregoing analysis that the proposed "degree-
of-involvement" approach comes nearest to accommodating the two
policies that justify specialized regulation of investment companies.
The uniform regulations fail to effectuate the investor-protection policy
in the case where there has been bargaining between an investment
company and a company owning five percent or more of its stock. The
only difficulty with the 1940 Act, as Congress may have intended it to
operate, is that it leads to interference with transactions where there has
137 See text accompanying note 95 & text accompanying notes 119-20 supra.
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been a general offering in similar terms and where there is little likeli-
hood that affiliates have engaged in self-dealing. But the 1940 Act as
applied by the SEC pays court to the bogus policy of protecting all
parties incidentally connected to every transaction the investment com-
pany enters. Moreover, by failing to except activities and transactions
having little likelihood of insider self-dealing, the Act serves to hinder
the involvement-fostering policy. Thus the 1940 Act as presently ad-
ministered appears the least satisfactory of the alternative methods of
regulation.
B. The Effects of Portfolio Scrutiiy: Mandate for a New Approach
So long as transactions with portfolio affiliates are to be scru-
tinized, as they are under the framework presently maintained by the
SEC, irreconcilable conflict will persist between the policy of investor
protection (which manifests itself in making dealings between invest-
ment company and affiliate uncomfortable) and the policy of encourag-
ing better institutional citizenship in our corporate democracies. This
conflict will be accentuated in the years to come, particularly if the effect
of decreasing liquidity becomes more manifest. 138  This latter factor
will exert pressure on investment companies to retain their positions in
portfolio companies even where they are dissatisfied with a portfolio
company's management; this more lasting commitment may push the
investment companies into greater involvement in portfolio company
affairs. Indeed, tomorrow's version of the Talley case may well find
the investment company less able to plead non-involvement.
The present state of the law in this area brings two other regret-
table side-effects; it makes investment companies into corporate alba-
trosses, 139 as hapless portfolio companies find themselves-through no
choice of their own-subjected to undue SEC scrutiny, and it poten-
tially has turned a section of an act intended to protect investors of
moderate means, the shareholders in investment companies, into a pawn
in struggles for control and a weapon for strike-suitors.
This situation could be remedied by amending section 17: first, to
remove from the definition of "affiliated person," for purposes of section
17, the portfolio affiliate; second, to make clear that it is solely the
interest of the investment company shareholder that is to be considered
in weighing applications for exemption; and third, to exempt from the
SEC's scrutiny all routine, non-bargained transactions. The last two
adjustments, of course, could be accomplished by the SEC through its
rulemaking powers.
A more thorough analysis of the policies behind section 17, and
appropriate legislative and administrative steps directed toward achiev-
ing those policies, are thus suggested for developing a more rational
138 See generally Lyons, What Happens When Liquidity Disappears?, 3 INST.
INv., Nov. 1969, at 29.
139 Judge Friendly records that Sterling Precision considered its affiliation with
the Equity Corp. "a handicap to its operations." SEC v. Sterling Precision Corp.,
393 F.2d 214, 216 (2d Cir. 1968).
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regulatory approach. To this should be added the broader need to re-
examine and better articulate national policy with respect to the involve-
ment of institutional investors in the affairs of portfolio companies. 4 '
Some thirty years ago, when investment companies were seen as a
promising source of venture capital, it was determined that the net bene-
fits to be derived from cultivating that source would outweigh whatever
disadvantages were brought with the close involvement of investment
companies in the affairs of companies they funded and strongly in-
fluenced."' Today, a similar judgment might well be made with re-
spect to the benefits incident to a revitalized corporate democracy. But
unless a clear course is set, investment companies can hardly be faulted
for preferring not to risk involvement in section 17(d) litigation.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DOING BUSINESS UNDER Talley
On the assumption that legislative and administrative action can
not serve to solve immediate and existing problems, some suggestions
are offered with respect to steps portfolio affiliates interested in plan-
ning mergers in Talley-type situations might employ to avoid section
17's impact.
A court challenge to the SEC's interpretation of section 17-par-
ticularly, its far-ranging standard for exemptions under section 17 (b)-
might well succeed, but is unlikely to be brought; businessmen are not
likely to risk being the losers in test cases. Therefore, the safest route,
the one to be recommended as a matter of course until some change in
the law is brought about, is application for an exemption under section
17(b) and, if appropriate, rule 17d-1.
The exemption route is straightforward, even if the scope of in-
quiry prescribed by the SEC may be disputed as being broader than
that intended by the Act and as establishing an uncontemplated incon-
sistency in the treatment of violations of sections 17 (a) and (d). And
although few benefits may derive from having obtained an exemption,142
the consequence of failure to secure an exemption may be so drastic,
including potential voiding of the transaction,'43 that it might well be
unreasonable to fail to apply for exemption. Applications may be filed
after the fact,'44 but the SEC is reluctant to grant retroactive exemp-
tions. The Commission may be willing to exempt the status quo, but
not to excuse the transaction occasioning the violation;i" or it may
140 See SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64,
pt. 5, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2763 (1971).
141 INVESTMENT TRUST STUDY, supra note 79, pt. 4, at 369.
142 For example, the parties may still be open to shareholder suits on the ground
that the transaction was so unfair as to constitute a breach of fiduciary duty; see
Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60, 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
143 Investment Company Act of 1940 § 47, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46 (1970).
144 See Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release
No. 5682 (May 20, 1969). The history of the case, indicating after the fact applica-
tion, appears in 34 Fed. Reg. 7349-50 (1969).
145 Wisconsin Sec. Co., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 5708 (June
12, 1969).
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require the parties to rescind the original transaction and to reexecute
it after receiving the exemption.146
Companies not confident of receiving the SEC's approval, or not
willing to take the time to file for an exemption, may wish to try to
structure their transactions so as to avoid section 17. Some sugges-
tions follow, with the warning that resort to any of them may tempt the
SEC to bring an injunctive-relief action. The further warning should
be made that section 17(d) is a serious hazard, as soon as any delib-
erate structuring-particularly, involving the investment company-
enters a transaction.
The first, and simplest, possibility is to arrange the merger, where
feasible, with a non-affiliate of the investment company as the survivor.
Where a non-affiliate conducts an exchange of shares, section 17(a)
does not operate.
If both X and Y, wishing to merge, are portfolio affiliates of in-
vestment company Z, the first-mentioned alternative is no longer avail-
able. It may be that section 17 can nevertheless be avoided by selling
X's assets to Y, in exchange for Y's stock, with a delayed liquidation
of X. 147  (Z's participation in the liquidation of X would be exempted
under rule 17a-5.) 148 A significant problem with this operation is that
the formally separate transactions-the various steps-may be viewed
as really only interrelated parts of a single plan to exchange X stock for
that of Y with Z taking part in the exchange. Under this view, and
considering the rule of the Talley case, the operation comes within the
prohibition of section 17(a). The Supreme Court, however, has re-
cently indicated a reluctance to find statutory violations on the basis of
such an analysis. 49  It is possible further that the concurrent holding
of stock in Y by Z and its affiliate X may violate rule 17d-1; 10 in this
event, the SEC might well decide to look at the broader transaction.
146 Puritan Fund, Inc., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6531 (May
18, 1971). The history of the case, indicating rescision ordered prior to the exemption
application, appears in 36 Fed. Reg. 8175 (1971).
147 See Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958) (transfer
of assets for stock and subsequent liquidation constituted a valid merger). Contra,
Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc. 40 Del. Ch. 326, 182 A.2d 22 (Ch. 1962), aff'd,
41 Del. Ch. 74, 188 A.2d 123 Sup. Ct. 1963). See also Orzeck v. Englehart,
41 Del. Ch. 361, 195 A.2d 375 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
148 17 C.F.R. §270.17a-5 (1972) provides:
When a company makes a pro rata distribution in cash or in kind among
its common stockholders without giving any election to any stockholder as
to the specific assets which such stockholders shall receive, such distribution
shall not be deemed to involve a sale to or a purchase from such distributing
company as those terms are used in section 17(a) of the act.
149 Cf. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972) (corpora-
tions could not recover under § 16(b) of the 1934 Act profits derived from the sale
of shares by shareholders who first sold enough shares to reduce their holdings just
below 10%).
180 See note 77 supra & accompanying text.
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Finally, under section 3(a) (3) of the Act,"5 ' X will very likely be
deemed to have become an investment company at the point when more
than forty percent of its assets are securities; X's affiliation with Z may
then raise a problem under section 12(d) (1) (A) (i), 52 one of the
Act's anti-pyramiding provisions. Additionally, section 25,:," dealing
with the reorganization of investment companies, would involve the
SEC in X's liquidation, should section 3 (a) (3) have operated.
If either X or Y is controlled ... by Z the above technique would
be ineffective to avoid an immedate clash with section 17(a), in that
affiliates are prohibited under that section from either selling to or pur-
chasing from companies controlled by the affiliated investment company,
any property. In this event, X may try making an exchange offer to
Y's shareholders, with Z agreeing not to accept the exchange offer and
retaining a minority interest in Y (or, alternatively, agreeing to sell its
Y shares on the market). The risks under these arrangements are that
the SEC will find a violation of rule 17d-1 even in the agreement not
to transact business with one another, and, as mentioned in the preced-
ing paragraph, that the concurrent holding of Y stock by Z and its
affiliate X may pose a problem under the same rule.
If the techniques and the difficulties suggested here seem far-
fetched, then they are so only because they reflect the present state of
the law respecting portfolio affiliation with investment companies. In-
deed the need for reinterpretation, if not thorough revision, could
hardly be more evident.
15115 U.S.C. §80a-3(a)(3) (1970). See generally Kerr, The Inadvertent
Investment Company: Section 3(a)(3) of the Investment Company Act, 12 STAN.
L. REv. 29 (1959); Kerr & Applebaum, Inadvertent Investment Companies-Ten
Years After, 25 Bus. LAw. 887 (1970).
15215 U.S.C. §80a-12(d) (1) (A) (i) (1970). Cf. Baldwin Sec. Corp., 39
S.E.C. 498 (1959).
153 15 U.S.C. § 80a-25 (1970).
154 Twenty-five percent ownership of another's outstanding voting securities gives
rise to a presumption of "control." See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2 (a) (9) (1970).
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